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Abstract 
The global water crisis demands a new way of assessing water management, 
especially because of its role in previous as well as ongoing conflicts. In the last 
three decades, we have witnessed a wave of water management privatisation. The 
effects of this widespread privatisation have been varied and some are still 
unknown. This thesis aims to understand what elements of water management 
privatisation explain conflict. By developing a two-step theoretical framework and 
research design (with critical connotations), where qualitative and quantitative 
methods are combined to establish a more comprehensive comparative framework 
and analysis, this study fill several research gaps on the relation between 
privatisation of water and conflict in the Gaza Strip, Jordan, Israel and Yemen. The 
findings presented in the first step of the analysis conclude that each case illustrates 
a specific combination of different elements of privatisation of water management 
explaining the rise of political conflict. Though, with the implementation of a 
second step and a contextual perspective, the critical role of contextual factors is 
presented, in particular the importance of “unequal access” which is concluded to 
be an important factor in all cases displaying political conflict.    
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1 Introduction 
“And we made from water every living thing” (Quran, verse 21:30). This quote, 
from the English translation of the Quran, does not only establish that water has a 
spiritual and social meaning to every living being, but it outlines the most critical 
aspect of water: water is vital. Survival is based on the access to water.  
At the World Water Forum in the Hague in 2000, suddenly, two individuals 
from the audience got up on stage and revealed their naked bodies where they in 
black letters had inscribed "No to Water Privatization" and "Yes to Water as a 
Human Right". As they chained themselves to the podium where Egypt's Minister 
of Public Works and Water Resources, Mahmoud Abu Zeid, was supposed to start 
his inaugural speech of the conference, more people from the balconies of the 
conference hall started to unfold banners and scatter leaflets over the audience 
(BBC 2000). This act of protest reflects the wide range of social movements 
protesting against privatisation in different parts of the world; in Bolivia, India, 
South Africa, to name a few. Even in Ireland, where as many as 100,000 people 
have flooded the streets to march against the privatisation of water during the last 
ten years (Barraqué - Zandaryaa, 2011: 2; Zérah - Janakarajan - Llorente, 2011: 
211; Bakker, 2003).  
Water and its management are generating strong reactions. The privatisation of 
water during the last three decades has frequently been followed by noteworthy 
disagreement, public protests, hostility, violence, and social conflict (Castro, 2008: 
74-75; Lobina – Hall – Motta, 2005: 288). Also, this life source seems to involve 
moral sensitivities where profiting from the distribution of it provokes harsh 
emotions (Prasad 2006: 669; Davis 2005: 147). As a result of climate change, an 
increasing unpredictability of weather patterns and more droughts water 
management will be made a priority, not only because of it being a source to life 
but also as a way to handle conflicts (Falkenmark, 2013: 343).  
This “global water crisis”, as it is commonly referred to by academics and 
policymakers, has been assessed by several academic fields. While the dominant 
approach involves instrumental and infrastructural tools to eradicate water poverty, 
little attention has been given to the conflictual trajectory this might create 
(Clement, 2013: 154). The lack of water is perceived to cause conflict; however, 
while travelling in the desert landscape on the busier roads of West Bank there is 
something else more obvious that strikes one’s mind: it is not the lack of resources, 
but the uneven distribution. The almost Intrusive verdant Israeli settlements and 
dusty Palestinian villages raise the question of water management in relation to 
unequal access. The critical understanding by scholars within Political Ecology, 
stating that changes in water management might give rise to a chain of different 
social mechanisms, including conflict, is especially thought-provoking in this 
setting. Water and water management is obviously a cradle sensitive to changes, 
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and water privatisation has been a well-trodden subject in academic circles. 
However, practitioners and scholars are yet to arrive to a consensus. Despite the 
fact that water management in relation to conflict is a “hot topic”, there are still 
many under-researched areas by which future scholars’ contributions have been 
called for.  
Most research on water privatisation and its effects, derived from the academic 
and political institutions, are either focusing on or re-using data from a very few 
cases in specific parts of the world (Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and South-
East Asia) (Hall - Lobina – Motte, 2005: 289-291). Most likely because data 
availability is limited and only three large projects on water management (from 
1980 to 2001) has been carried out in North-Africa and the Middle-East, (Budds – 
McGranahan, 2003: 107). Another under-research area relates to the 
methodological aspects of earlier research within Political Ecology. A vital 
contribution will be to introduce a framework with a combination of qualitative-
quantitative methods and its results to this research field, where only a few or none 
have been conducted. Another contribution would naturally be to embrace the topic 
of disputes; privatisation and its effects.  
With the aim of exploring the debate of public-private management of water 
and its effects, and contributing to this research field, the primary purpose of this 
study is to study privatisation of water management in the Middle-East and its 
relation to conflict during the last two decades. Hence, the research question will 
be formulated in the following way:  
 
What elements of privatisation of water management in the Gaza Strip, Jordan, 
Yemen, and Israel can explain political conflict? 
 
To be able to answer the above research question, this study has adopted a theory 
developing ambition; combining the more instrumental approach established in 
Boudet, Jayasundera and Davis’ (2011) study with Bakker’s critical work 
embracing the importance of contextual aspects, both establishing the relation 
between privatisation of water and conflict. In addition, this study has adopted a 
“two-step” research design, where qualitative and quantitative methods are 
combined to establish a more comprehensive comparative methodological 
framework and analysis. With this developed framework and by providing previous 
literature with new findings on studies in the Middle-East, the results demonstrate 
the importance of a contextual “human-water” perspective to the presumed causal 
pathway, and more specifically the significance of “equal-unequal access” in the 
formation of privatisation of water management. In short, by adopting a critical 
perspective to Boudet et al., this thesis will hopefully fill in the research gaps on 
privatisation of water management and conflict. 
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1.1 Disposition 
Chapter two introduces prior research and the broad interdisciplinary approach to 
water privatisation. This is followed by the more specific relation between water 
and conflict and the debate between the instrumental and contextual perspective on 
water privatisation. In chapter three, the theoretical framework referring to Boudet 
et al. and their instrumental approach in addition to Bakker and her more contextual 
approach. This is concluded in a section on the develop theoretical framework 
adopted to this study, involving definitions of the variables. In chapter four, the 
research design and methodology are presented, explaining the two-step approach 
were a quantitative-qualitative fs/QCA is combined with a comparative contextual 
analysis. In chapter five, the analysis of the four cases establishing the raw data and 
processed data of the fs/QCA and the findings from a contextual comparative 
analysis. Finally, in chapter six, the project elements and contextual factors of 
privatisation explaining political conflict is discussed. 
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2 Previous research 
2.1 An interdisciplinary approach 
While this study will primarily focus on the type of water management and its 
effects, this limitation is derived from several fields of research. This chapter, 
concerning previous research, is divided into three subfields: (1) the historical 
background and theoretical debate with proponents and opponents of water 
privatisation, (2) the relation between water and conflict, and (3) the relation 
between privatisation of water and conflict.  
This study involves a wide range of different theoretical approaches, yet, at the 
same time excluding much research on water. While a wide range of insights from 
different subfields on water has been useful for this study’s broader understanding 
of the topic, the research described here is narrowed to the literature on water in 
relation to privatisation and conflict, since broader understandings are perceived 
outside the scope of this study. 
2.1.1 Historical background & the public private binary 
To generate profit from water management, this demands large infrastructural 
investments. These large-scale investments create a threshold or a ‘natural 
monopoly’ that limits the potential of competitive price adjustments (Mill in Davis, 
2005: 159; Spiller – Savedoff, 1999: 121), hence, stressing the need for 
governmental supervision to encourage competition within the private market. In 
the 1990’s, almost one billion people in the Middle-East and the rest of the world 
lacked access to adequate drinking water, as a result from inefficiency, under-
investment and rent-seeking behaviour. In the light of this, it seemed unjustifiable 
to not involve private investment in the water sector. Additionally, with 
governments’ inability to eradicate this issue, it was deemed unethical not to invite 
private actors into water management (Marin, 2009: 18-20).  
At the International Conference on Water and Environment held in Dublin in 
1992, water was recognised as an economic good and part of the broader 
Washington Consensus on development. It was acknowledged that water, like any 
other good, should be the subject of market prices (Marin, 2009: 147). This new 
paradigm of private investment in the water management sector resulted in the 
creation of the world’s three largest water companies (Veolia Environnement 
Vivendi, Suez Environmental and Thames Water), providing water for over 300 
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million individuals in 200 countries (Bronwen, 2005: 3). For a more detailed 
explanation of this privatisation paradigm see “The New Water Paradigm: the 
privatization of governance and the instrumentalization of the State” by Mattias 
Finger, in The Business of Global Environmental Governance by David L. Levy 
and Peter John Newell (ed.). 
With an expansion of privatisation of water management worldwide, various 
constellations of public-private partnership emerged. These collaborations in turn 
decide the level of autonomy for private actors (Bakker, 2010: xvi). For a more 
comprehensive understanding of privatisation of water management see the 
definition in the next chapter. 
Regarding the effects generated from the privatisation of water, there are two 
major camps of opponents and proponents discussing the public-private binary. In 
short, the proponents of privatisation of resources argue that: introducing market 
principles will increase efficiency, allow for capital investment, and create a 
motivation to conserve water. It has also been pointed out that the government itself 
is more likely to criticise and act against a private operator than against a 
governmental corporation (Massarutto, 2011: 290; Marin, 2009: 3-4). Opposed to 
these arguments, the opponents of privatisation of resources claim that profit-driven 
management will not improve general access to water. Instead, they argue for the 
opposite, that commodifying water creates unequal distribution. Furthermore, 
opponents have emphasised it to be highly unethical to commodify and make profit 
of a resource as vital as water (Bakker, 2003: 44). 
2.1.2 Water in relation to conflict 
To be able to understand the social mechanisms that changing patterns in water 
management might generate, we are required to broaden our understanding to 
involve human behaviours and the relations between humans and water. This 
“human-water approach” presents a vital critique towards the technical and 
instrumental view on water, namely; the ambiguous and dynamic nature of water 
(on an individual perspective) is often overlooked, that water might be seen as an 
“ecological necessity, an industrial input, a religious symbol, a commodity, an 
economic good or a public good" (Bakker, 2010: 3). Hence, it might be interpreted, 
according to this approach, that changes in water management will have various 
consequences, including consequences of socioeconomic, cultural as well as an 
ecological character (Bronwen, 2005: 11; Harvey, 2003: 158). 
Many researchers have speculated whether changing patterns in access to water 
might give rise to conflict. However, there is little consensus on this presumed 
correlation. Among the more recognised researchers within this field, Homer-Dixon 
(1999) proposes that unequal access to water might, through ‘social effects', 
generate conflict. He puts special emphasis on the decreasing access to water as a 
catalyst to conflict, and other researchers have come to similar conclusions (e.g., 
Gizzelis – Wooden, 2010; Hauge – Ellingsen, 1998; Raleigh – Urdal, 2007). 
However, Homer-Dixon and his supporters have been widely criticised. For 
instance, Zeitoun et al. (2013) have critiqued the importance of unequal or 
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decreasing access, proposing that it is rather the securitisation of a particular 
resource that might give rise to conflict (ibid: 5). Similarly, others have recognised 
that other variables might be of greater importance, in contrast to Homer-Dixon’s 
understanding (e.g. Couttenier – Soubeyran, 2013; Salehyan – Hendrix, 2014; 
Theisen, 2008). Nonetheless, Homer-Dixon, as well as his critics, have been 
accused of an oversimplification; assuming that there is a direct linkage between 
the dependent variable (i.e. conflict) and the independent variable (i.e. resources). 
Critics have emphasised that an analysis of such complex variables as conflict and 
water is required to include variables "in between", namely other variables that will 
uncover the complex and dynamic nature of water (Barraqué - Zandaryaa, 2011: 5). 
Others have emphasised that this linkage should rather be understood as a “causal 
combination” where independent variables are understood and set in relation to 
other variables (independent variables) as well as the outcome (the dependent 
variable). Within a set-theoretic relational approach, causality is understood as, not 
based on correlations but as causal combinations (Boudet et al. 2011: 501; Ragin, 
2006: 3). Another significant shortcoming of previous research involves a lack of 
attention towards political, economic and the contextual aspects of water (Botton – 
Merlinsky, 2011: 123-124). Anthropological studies have shown that stability and 
sustainability rather than efficiency and equal access are more important when 
dealing with the prevention of conflict (Mosse, 1997: 498-499).  
In short, there is a lack of consensus on what variables (and how these variables) 
might cause conflict.  
2.1.3 The relation between privatisation of water & conflict  
At the World Bank’s Energy Forum in 2003, a representative from the global 
consulting firm, Deloitte, noted a “growing political opposition to privatization in 
emerging markets due to widespread perception that it does not serve the interests 
of the population at large” (Hall et al, 2005: 287). While a limited number of 
researchers have examined the relationship between privatisation and conflict, even 
fewer have assessed water privatisation and its linkage to conflict; a contentious 
issue where consensus among researchers is rare. In this section and applied to this 
study's theoretical framework, the debate on water privatisation and its relation to 
conflict will be assessed. 
In recent decades, several practitioners and scholars have noted that conflicts 
have derailed and caused delays in privatisation projects around the world (see 
Birdsall – Nellis, 2003; Castro, 2008; Davis, 2005; Guasch, 2004; Klein, 1996; 
Prasad, 2006). In Ghana, Honduras, and India, as well as in more industrialised 
countries such as France, Germany and the US, privatisation projects have been met 
with significant levels of conflicts. One of the most commonly cited examples is 
the ‘Cochabamba Water War’ in Bolivia in 2000. This water conflict involved a 
series of violent protests in response to the privatisation of the city’s water supply 
company, the result of raised water rates and unequal access to water (Nickson – 
Vargas, 2002: 99; Perreault, 2006: 151). Then, what is it about privatisation that 
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tends to give rise to conflict? Hall et al. (2005), have proposed that privatisation has 
never functioned well due to several embedded flaws. While many scholars 
similarly criticise the privatisation apparatus as a whole, only a few scholars have 
pointed to specific elements within the privatisation apparatus. Among these few 
scholars, Castro (2006: 3-4) and Swyngedouw (2005: 92-93) argue that the assumed 
autonomy of private companies, where firms remain less accountable to democratic 
principles and rules of transparency, tend to cause grievances and subsequently 
conflict. This, in turn, will result in a reduced level of state autonomy which will 
affect the state’s capability to overhaul price rates and capacity to create 
competitive bidding (Bakker, 2008: 247). Furthermore, by employing privatisation, 
some have emphasised the risk of producing a few large companies who can invest 
in multiple locations, using the same blueprint and, thus, ignoring local customs 
and local complexity (Bronwen, 2005: 4). 
In reference to privatisation of water management, although both proponents 
and opponents have acknowledged that privatisation of water often fails to deliver 
what it has promised (Araral, 2009; Bakker, 2003; Bel - Warner, 2008; Dore et al., 
2004; Hailu et al., 2012; Tan, 2012), there is still a lack of consensus on the 
epistemological and ontological assumptions concerning how privatisation of water 
management and its relation to conflict should be interpreted. While the 
proponents-opponents debate mainly focuses on the “evils of neoliberalism” (Davis 
et al. 2010: 291), other researchers have focused on the specific elements within the 
privatisation apparatus and their relation to conflict. The more instrumental or 
institutional perspective on privatisation of water management have examined the 
specific project elements within the privatisation apparatus, arguing for the idea that 
the right blueprint might be able to provide “a frictionless privatisation” (Boudet et 
al, 2011; Orr – Scott, 2011: 179; World Bank, 2007: xxviii, 134-135). In contrast 
to this approach, post-structural critics from the discipline of Political Ecology have 
accused this former approach of being too simplified; an analysis of such complex 
and dynamic variables as privatisation and water requires contextual aspects to be 
taken into account. It is furthermore important to note that scholars derived from 
this critical approach generally have little trust in the privatisation of water and the 
adhering belief in tearing down centuries of old traditions surrounding water 
allocation with new maximising tools (Bresnihan, 2015: 116; Bakker, 2010: 221-
222). In reference to privatisation and the conflictual situation in the Middle-East, 
it has been noted that “the persistence of century-old Islamic and customary rights 
coupled with technological and economic progress introduced from outside over 
the past thirty years have led to the present water problems" (Kohler, 2000: 177). 
These arguments are of course derived from opponents of privatisation of resources, 
and it is important to note that modern management at the same time have been able 
to increase water allocation per capita (AQAUASTAT 2018). Nevertheless, the 
insights derived from involving the contextual and complex nature of water and 
privatisation are essential, especially to improve a more simplified approach to the 
privatisation of water management and its relation to conflict.  
The theoretical framework (as well as the research design) developed in this 
study involves insights gathered from the instrumental approach as well as the more 
critical approaches, in this study defined as the instrumental approach and the 
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contextual approach. Something which few scholars have done on privatisation of 
water management in relation to conflict.  
  11 
3 Theory 
With a theory developing ambition, to contribute to critical aspects of earlier 
theoretical frameworks, this study will combine two different theories: (1) the 
influential scholar within the discipline of Political Ecology, Karen Bakker, and her 
work on water and privatisation and (2) Boudet, Jayasundera and Davis’ study on 
infrastructural investments in the private-sector and conflict derived from a more 
instrumental approach. Hence, in this chapter the theoretical framework will be 
presented, beginning with an outline of these scholars’ academic work and 
viewpoints, followed by the theoretical framework developed for this study.  
Boudet, Jayasundera and Davis’ study on “Drivers of Conflict in Developing 
Country Infrastructure Projects: Experience from the Water and Pipeline Sectors” 
(2011) entails prior research of major infrastructural investments on pipelines and 
water in the private-sector and their association with the emergence of conflict in 
different parts of the world (Boudet et al., 2011: 498-499). By examining several 
independent variables, using a multivariate analysis, Boudet et al. conclude that 
seven different project elements of privatisation of water management were drivers 
of conflict. In this thesis, project elements are defined in accordance with the 
definition provided by Boudet et al, as “procedural and organizational aspects of a 
[privatisation] project” (2011: 499). 
 The project elements (of either high or low degree) causing conflict according 
to the analysis presented by Boudet et al. are: (1) significant economic impact on 
households, (2) host country as equity partner, (3) high number of connections to 
international NGOs, (4) little proactive consultation, (5) international financial 
institution involvement, (6) competitive bidding, (8) contract type and (7) large size 
(ibid: 498, 507). These project elements are further discussed and defined in the 
section presenting the theoretical framework (see 3.2). The presumed causal 
pathway is in their study presented in accordance with Ragin’s view on “set-
theoretic relations”. Within the idea of set-theoretic relations “causality” is 
understood, not based on correlations (i.e. an independent variable causes the 
dependent variable), but as a “causal combination” (i.e. independent variables 
combined, and set in relation to the outcome, will generate the outcome) (Boudet et 
al., 2011: 501; Ragin, 2006: 3). 
This presumed causal pathway is furthermore dependent on if there is a “legal 
conflict” in the area. Boudet and his colleagues’ definition of conflict is 
differentiated into two different aspects: (1) legal conflict refers to “that which 
occurs within the formal structures provided by the host country, project sponsors, 
or development agency for voicing concerns or opposition to a conflict” (ibid: 499) 
and; (2) political conflict refers to that which occurs outside of these structures, 
such as peaceful or violent strikes/rallies/demonstrations, arrests, injuries or 
damages to projects (ibid: 499, 503, 510). In short, according to Boudet et al, these 
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seven project elements of privatisation of water management in addition to legal 
conflict explain political conflict. 
Even though their study entails a comprehensive model of several variables, 
some simplified explanations of this more instrumental approach make it easily 
criticised. By overlooking the contextual features of these variables, Boudet et al. 
are likely excluding factors that are essential to explain the different or similar 
outcomes of the cases analysed. For this purpose, this study involves a “two-step” 
design adding a contextual perspective to the theoretical framework, involving 
contextual factors. This critical perspective and these contextual factors derive from 
Bakker’s study on privatisation of water management. 
The vast amount of research produced by Bakker entails a cross-disciplinary 
viewpoint derived from Urban Environment, Human Geography and Development 
Studies. By adopting the “human-water approach”, she criticises the simplified and 
de-contextualised models of earlier research, emphasising that the debate 
surrounding the public-private binary ignore the complex interrelationships 
between human communities and water usage. The importance of an individual and 
local perspective is especially highlighted in this regard. Bakker argues that the 
fundamental issue with privatisation of water management is the fact that “private 
actors – particularly those motivated by profit – will fail to conserve resources and 
will cause negative environmental impacts over the long term” (2014: 475), this in 
reference to the fall of the “state hydraulic paradigm” - in this study referred to as 
“post-state hydraulic paradigm”. The rise and fall of the state hydraulic paradigm 
entails the rise and fall of state involvement in the management and ownership of 
water in the nineteenth, twentieth and twenty-first century. While sufficient supply 
of water provided by the state enabled populations to achieve basic living standards 
and resulted in a facilitation of social inclusion, privatisation experiments resulted 
in the exclusion of poor neighbourhoods by private companies “which cherry-
picked profitable neighborhoods and types of consumers” (Bakker, 2014: 471-472; 
Bakker, 2010: 60, 85). Furthermore, Bakker highlights the negative environmental 
impacts the profit-driven management of water tend to have in developing 
countries, what Bakker terms an “ecological fix” (Bakker, 2014: 475).  
In sum, while reviewing Bakker’s research on privatisation and water, 
especially three factors within the “post-state hydraulic paradigm” stands out as 
recurring themes. These are interpreted as vital to Bakker’s contextual explanation 
of the effects of privatisation and, thus, important to involve in a critical analysis of 
the privatisation of water management. The three central factors within the “post-
state hydraulic paradigm” and its effects are: (1) unequal access to water, (2) 
ecological fix, and (3) water security-related fears (Bakker, 2011: 364; Bakker, 
2014: 472, 480, 487). A detailed definition of these factors follows in following 
section.  
In the section below, the theory developing ambition will be further discussed; 
presenting a new model on how to understand and analyse privatisation, water, and 
conflict by combining Boudet et al. and Bakker’s theoretical frameworks and 
results.  
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3.1 Theoretical framework - defining variables 
In the section below, the variables applied in the analysis will be presented. For the 
operationalisation of the variables see the next chapter. It is important to note that 
this model and the conceptualisation of these variables are based on the assumption 
of “causal combinations”, that these variables in combination and in relation to the 
outcome will generate the outcome. Furthermore, before turning to the 
conceptualisation of the variables, it is important to note that the conceptualisation 
of privatisation is complex and differ between scholars. In this study, privatisation 
is understood in accordance with the definition provided by Davis (2005: 148), 
Kessides (1993: 98) and Bakker (2003: 337), some of the more prominent scholars 
in the field. Hence, privatisation is defined in line with “a gradation” of four 
different types of privatisation; ranging from the lightest form of privatisation (i.e. 
where specific activities are controlled by a state provision service) to the heavier 
form of privatisation (i.e. where ownership is completely transferred to private 
interests).  
This study, the research design as well as the theoretical framework, is divided 
in two steps, where the first step involves the variables provided by Boudet et al. 
and the second step involves Bakker’s contextual perspective were specific 
contextual factors are analysed:  
(1) The first step encompasses the dependent variable, which refer to political  
conflict, and the independent variables, which refer to eight project elements. The 
project elements include; contract type, economic impact on households, role for 
host country as equity partner, proactive consultation, international financial 
institution involvement, competitive bidding, and size. Additionally, the 
independent variables include legal conflict. While Boudet et al. have included 
“connections to international NGOs” in their independent variables, this study will 
not, and instead include this concept in “legal conflict”. Boudet et al. argue that 
connections to international NGOs are included within the concept of legal conflict; 
if there is a legal conflict one might expect a high level of connections to 
international NGOs, and the reverse might be expected if no legal conflict exists 
(Boudet et al, 2011: 500; Jayasundera, 2009: iv). Hence, this variable will be added 
to the legal conflict variable.  
(2) The second step involves the contextual perspective, where Bakker’s “post- 
state hydraulic paradigm” and the adhering three factors are included; unequal 
access to water, ecological fix and water security-related fears.  
 Below follows the conceptualisation of the different variables and factors, 
divided into the two-step design. 
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3.1.1 The first step  
Dependent variable 
 
1. Political conflict 
The dependent variable in this study is limited to a specific type of conflict, 
namely political conflict. This variable refers to the model and study made by 
Boudet et al, where the dependent variable similarly refers to political conflict, 
conceptualised as; that which occurs outside of institutional structures, such as 
peaceful or violent strikes/rallies/demonstrations, arrests, injuries, or damages 
to projects (Boudet et al. 2011: 499, 503, 510). 
 
Independent variables  
 
2. Contract type 
This variable is, in short, conceptualised as “lease or concession”, i.e. whether 
a privatisation project and the adhering contract encompasses high levels of 
responsibility and transparency (i.e. concession, or high levels of autonomy) or 
low levels of responsibility and transparency (i.e. lease, or low levels of 
autonomy). This variable will allow for an analysis of differences in levels of 
autonomy of privatisation of water management in different contexts. This 
project element is highlighted in Boudet et al. and have been introduced by 
several other scholars (see for example Jayasundera, 2009: 12; Boudet et al. 
2011: 499, 503, 504; Bakker, 2010: 27-28).  
 
3. Economic impact on households 
This variable is conceptualised as whether there is an increase or decrease of 
economic costs for households, i.e. if there is an increase or decrease in prices 
of water after a contract is signed with a private company. This variable is based 
on the assumption that political conflict is more likely to emerge when a change 
in management affects local consumers’ economy (Davis 2005: 145-146; 
Boudet et al. 2011: 500, 502, 506).  
 
4. Role for host country as equity partner 
This variable is conceptualised according to the assumption that if an 
infrastructural project derived from foreign investors fails to engage the local 
state or community this might generate anger. If only foreign investors are 
involved in the benefits of the project and the officials and local community do 
not have any personal investments in project, these local actors will have less 
incentives to ensure a frictionless project and are more likely to blame potential 
failures on the external actor (Boudet et al. 2011: 500-501). 
 
5. Proactive consultation 
This variable is conceptualised in line with the assumption that if proactive 
consultation (i.e. regular consultations with the public) is involved in the 
infrastructural project, this will result in less opposition as well as “reduced 
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financial risk (from delays, legal disputes, and negative publicity), direct cost 
savings, increased market share (through good public image), and enhanced 
social benefits to local communities” (Environment Division 1998 in Davis et 
al 2011; Beierle – Cayford, 2002: 11-12; Boudet et al, 2011: 500, 502). In short, 
if proactive consultation is involved in a privatisation project the likelihood of 
political conflict is small. 
 
6. International financial institution involvement 
This variable is conceptualised in line with the assumption that if Western 
institutions, such as the World Bank, are contributing with investments and 
founding of the infrastructural project in a non-Western country, which in turn 
results in increased involvement, regulations, and oversights by these 
institutions, this will most likely attract local opposition. Hence, projects that 
are fully sponsored by Western funds are more likely to be associated with 
political conflict (Boudet et al. 2011: 502-503). 
 
7. Competitive bidding 
This variable is conceptualised in line with the idea of “sole-sourcing”, which 
refers to the where one company is awarded a contract without competitive 
bidding. This is thus based on the assumption that, to produce the right prices 
in a water management contract a formal, structured, competitive process is 
required. A process with multiple competitive bidders is commonly understood 
as a way of arriving at a reliable bid. Hence, the assumption is that the inclusion 
of high levels of competitive bidding following regulatory frameworks might 
prevent local and international grievances, and political conflict is more likely 
to occur if there are low levels of competitive bidding (i.e. sole-sourcing or non-
competitive bidding) (Boudet et al. 2011: 500, 502).  
 
8. Size  
This variable is conceptualised in accordance with the assumption that the 
overall size of a project is related to the “size” of the public opposition (Dear, 
1992: 292). If the project’s size is large, measured in terms of the size of the 
USD investment, political conflict is more likely to occur because larger 
projects are expected to intensify reactions compared to small investments 
(Boudet et al. 2011: 499-500).  
 
9. Legal conflict 
This variable is conceptualised according to the assumption that the presumed 
causal pathway (project elements of privatisation correlating with conflict) is 
dependent on if there is a “legal conflict” in the area. Legal conflict refers to 
“that which occurs within the formal structures provided by the host country, 
project sponsors, or development agency for voicing concerns or opposition to 
a conflict” (Boudet et al. 2011: 499).  
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3.1.2 The second step  
This second step in the theoretical framework is based on the arguments made by 
several scholars within the discipline of Political Ecology; a local “human-water” 
perspective and inclusion of contextual factors are required to provide a 
comprehensive and reliable analysis of the privatisation of water management 
(Wolf, 1972: 202; Bakker, 2010). This concept is conceptualised according to the 
interpretation of Bakker’s understanding of the “post-state hydraulic paradigm”, 
where especially three factors are understood as vital to include in an analysis of 
the privatisation and its effects. The first factor within this concept, and which is 
included to this second step of the theoretical framework, is (I) unequal access to 
water which refers to the level of social inclusion/exclusion as an effect of the 
distribution of and access to water. Bakker has emphasised that privatisation and 
profit-driven projects have resulted in private companies “cherry-picking” 
profitable neighbourhoods and types of consumers, which in turn tend to generate 
public opposition (Bakker, 2014: 471). The second factor highlighted by Bakker is 
(II) ecological fix which refers to the gains made by profit-driven actors at the 
expense of the environment, where actors temporarily devolve costs onto the 
environment, which likewise tend to generate public opposition (Bakker, 2011: 
364; Bakker, 2014: 475). The third relates to (III) water security-related fears. 
Given the broader security concerns associated with water; based on the fact that 
water is one of the most vital resources for all living beings and the fact that water 
stress “is already a widespread and growing phenomenon” and “is not likely to be 
offset by [potential] water efficiency” (Bakker, 2014: 480), it has been assumed that 
local communities (as well as governmental institutions) “may be less willing to 
cede control over the development of water resources and large-scale hydraulic 
infrastructure to nonstate [or private] actors” (ibid). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual model of the theoretical framework 
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3.2 Limitations  
This study involves several limitations. The first limitation refers to the level of 
analysis. The selected variables refer to the domestic level of analysis, excluding 
effects or variables on an international level (see Levy, 1998: 151). Evidence of 
several cases suggests that changing patterns in water management might have 
effects on interstate politics (Zeitung, 2008: 19-20). While the international level of 
analysis allows for a broader understanding of the variables and their effects, these 
require different frameworks and additional data. The limited time frame and scope 
of this study, however, do not allow for further expansion, thus, referring only to 
the domestic level of analysis. 
Secondly, it is important to note that the theories adopted to this study are 
founded and refer to contexts that are different from the ones in the Middle-East, 
presenting this study with a risk of focusing on and analysing elements that might 
not be as important in the Middle-East region. However, the fact that the Middle-
Eastern region reflects an under-research area on privatisation of water 
management calls for theory development and that previous theories are applied to 
this specific region.  
Thirdly, this study intends to remain impartial, although the primary focus 
concerns conflictual outcomes of privatisation. Hence, not focusing on potential 
positive outcomes such as increasing coverage of water networks and an increase 
of water quantity (World Bank, 2007: 136). Even though privatisation of water 
management, given the "right" circumstances, might reduce the likelihood of 
conflict, the majority of privatisation projects of water management in developing 
countries have failed to deliver what was promised (Araral, 2009; Bel - Warner, 
2008; Tan, 2012). 
Fourthly and lastly, due to the limited scope of this study, it has been necessary 
to exclude detailed descriptions of each case's historical and contextual background. 
The failure or successful adaption to neo-liberal reforms and privatisation is, of 
course, dependent on the geopolitical and geo-economic conditions as well as the 
specific regulative and historical trajectories of each case. As has been concluded 
by Spulber and Sabbaghi; all states are not equally adaptive to privatization (1998: 
198-199). Due to the limited scope, this study will analyse the specific contextual 
backgrounds surrounding the project elements and exclude a more comprehensive 
analysis – however, the study will take this critical limitation into account. 
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4 Methodology 
 
4.1 Research design 
This study intends, as already been stated, to combine a contextual and critical 
perspective with a more instrumental perspective of privatisation of water 
management. This has created a need for more advanced “two-step” research design 
which involves both qualitative and quantitative features. The first step involves the 
same methodology that was adopted by Boudet et al. (2011), namely a Fuzzy Set 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fs/QCA). While this method involves some 
complex features, to improve the reliability of the generated results as well as 
introduce the contextual factors to this analysis, this method will be supported by a 
more traditional Comparative Contextual Analysis, the second step of the research 
design. In the following section, these methods and how they will be applied to this 
study are presented in more detail.  
4.1.1 Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fs/QCA) & 
Comparative Contextual Analysis  
The fs/QCA method was first established by Charles Ragin (1987; 2009; 2017). In 
line with the research question and the aim of this study, a fs/QCA method embraces 
the possibility of several independent variables explaining one single outcome. This 
method allows for several different independent variables to be coded through in-
depth material of several cases, hence, differing from other more traditional 
comparative case study designs, which only allow for a small number of 
independent variables and cases. Furthermore, this fs/QCA recognises the set-
theoretical relational idea of “causal combinations” (i.e. independent variables 
combined, and set in relation to the outcome, will explain the outcome), in contrast 
to more commonly adopted methods based on correlations.  
The fact that a database of material, on simply privatisation or privatisation in 
relation to conflict, is missing from this research field makes any large-N study 
challenging to apply. This limited availability of material has made it necessary to 
use "desktop studies" of news-articles, academic journals, and books. The fs/QCA 
allows for setting up unique criteria for each variable and based on these criteria is 
able to calibrate the gathered information.  
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The fs/QCA method is based on a Boolean algebra to determine the different 
causal pathways. The different values if the independent variables are put together 
to provide evidence for the concluding results. These key causal combinations, or 
“recipes”, refers to a binary scale, or crispy set, where 1 is fully in and 0 is fully out. 
In this study, however, this way of determining causal pathways have been 
broadened to involve a broader set of values than the binary scale of 1 and 0; 
involving fuzzy set values with interval, ordinal, or nominal indicators, coded by 
values “in-between”, ranging from 0 to 1, e.g., .20, .40, .60. In short, this will allow 
us to foresee the causal combination between the independent variables and 
dependent variable; that privatisation influences conflict, and not the other way 
around.  
The data program called Compass (fsqca), established by Ragin (2017), has 
been adopted to this study's research design, mainly because this data program is 
required within a fs/QCA. When the raw data have been codified, the values are 
processed in the Compass program, which in turn determines the consistency and 
coverage. Consistency “reflects the frequency with which a combination of causal 
conditions leads to a particular outcome” (Boudet et al., 2011: 505; Ragin, 2006: 
1). Thus, if the consistency score reflects more than 80 percent (0.8), this means 
that we can conclude with certainty that a specific combination of causal conditions 
(i.e. a combination of variables) explains a particular outcome (i.e. the dependent 
variable) (Ragin, 2009: 119). Coverage, on the other hand, relates to the empirical 
relevance of the causal pathway, i.e. this combination of causal conditions that 
explains a particular outcome corresponds to a certain degree with the case studies 
included in the analysis (Boudet et al., 2011: 505; Ragin, 2006: 1). As already been 
mentioned earlier, this presumed causality, which consistency and coverage refers 
to, reflects the “causal combination” where the independent variables combined, 
and set in relation to the outcome, are assumed to explain the outcome (Boudet et 
al. 2011: 501; Ragin, 2006: 3). 
In the second step of this study’s research design a comparative contextual 
analysis is applied. The comparative contextual analysis incorporates the 
assumption that actors on the domestic and individual level are shaped by 
contextual factors (Findlay – Henham, 2007: 104-105). In a comparative contextual 
analysis, the focus lies on contextual aspects of the social reality, reflecting 
historical, social, political as well as economic features, since these aspects shape 
the local context and the potential outcome (Ibid: 109). Moreover, this method 
involves both structural features and agents into the analysis. This second step of 
the methodology relates to the results provided in the fs/QCA, as well as additional 
information on the contextual factors (referring to Bakker’s “post-state hydraulic 
paradigm”). 
Hence, this second step is essential to incorporate a contextual perspective to 
the analysis, to be able to grasp the more qualitative and contextual aspects that are 
difficult to merely reduce to number. Moreover, this comparative contextual 
analysis is made possible due to the relatively small number of cases involved in 
this study, in comparison to other fs/QCA studies that involves a greater number of 
cases.  
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4.2 Operationalisation  
The operationalisation of the dependent variable and independent variables is 
presented in the figure below. This operationalisation is based on Boudet et al. 
(2011: 501-503) and, in some cases, these have been slightly modified to 
correspond with the case studies.  
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4.3 Case selection & time frame 
There is a lack of case studies on privatisation of water carried out in the Middle-
East. This has provided this study with a difficulty in data availability, which in turn 
has laid the foundation for why this study only has incorporated a few cases – where 
data have been easier to obtain. These cases are: the Gaza strip’s 1997 management 
contract and its suspension; Jordan’s 1999 management contract; Yemen 2002 
concessions cooperative and communal arrangements and the intensive local 
conflict over water; and Israel’s 2006 private entrepreneurship or build-operate-
transfer and the civil mass protest. These cases, in turn, are estimated to be among 
the top countries with perpetual water stress (World Resource Institute 2018). 
Furthermore, this selection provides this study with cases with both “positive” and 
“negative” outcomes. Namely, the Gaza Strip and Yemen indicates a high level of 
the dependent variable (positive), Jordan refers to a lower level of the dependent 
variable (negative), and Israel relates to somewhere in-between (positive-negative). 
By involving both positive and negative cases, a comparative analysis with greater 
degree of validity is possible. Even though different, all these cases involve the 
tension and dynamics between privatisation, water, and conflict.  
By adopting a fs/QCA method, this study is presented with the option of a 
minimum of four cases and the maximum of 16 variables (Berg-Schlosser - de Meur 
2008: 28). As already been mentioned, due to the limited availability of data this 
study will adopt the minimum number of cases.  
The selection of the time frame of each case refers to Kessides’ definition of 
privatisation contracts’ usual duration. Kessides (1993: 98) notes that a 
management contract usually extends to 5-7 years, while other contract types lack 
a time limit. Hence, a 7-year period, from that the contract is signed, will frame this 
study’s data collection and analysis.  
In the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century, 
many states in the Middle-East conducted several privatisation projects of water 
management. In addition to the chosen cases, Kuwait, Egypt, Oman, Lebanon, 
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Bahrain all embraced privatisation (World Bank 2007: 43-
44). However, due to a lack of academic material and the fact that the data from 
these cases were predominantly from potentially biased NGOs, these cases have not 
been included in this study.  
In other case studies in the Middle-East, such as the West Bank, Egypt and 
Oman, the privatisation projects were opposed and terminated it begun (Budds – 
McGranahan, 2003: 107). While these cases are in line with the argumentation that 
privatisation steer conflict, since there was no actual privatisation project in these 
areas the effects of different project elements cannot be analysed. In this study, the 
Middle-East is narrowed to and defined according to Cambridge dictionary (2018) 
which does not embrace the North-African continent.  
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4.4 Data collection & material  
The “rough” codification provided with a fs/QCA codification enables an analysis 
of various interacting variables, however, it might involve some validity errors. The 
qualitative material on privatisation tends to be financed by companies or NGOs 
with a specific agenda. In a critical examination of the material, avoiding biased 
information and using triangulation have been required to strengthen the study’s 
validity. The majority of the data analysed in this study is derived from academic 
publications in books and journals from different research fields, in addition to 
information derived from well-established and impartial NGOs and news-reports. 
For instance, the data on Yemen is partly based on Mewes’ book on 
Decentralization on the Example of the Yemeni Water Sector (2011), in addition to 
a number of academic articles from other research fields; from Economics (e.g. Beh 
-Alameer, 2012) and Political Science (e.g. Moore 2011) and various research 
projects and news-reporting (e.g. ECC, 2018a; Ferguson, 2015).  
It is important to note, what might be the most significant limitation of the 
findings provided in this study, the findings are shaped and limited to the available 
data. However, by involving both primary and secondary sources and triangulation 
to this study, in addition to excluding information that is debated (or included with 
a short argumentation on why they are considered in the appendix), this limitation 
might be averted. This might increase the intersubjectivity of the codified data set 
for future researchers to examine and use. 
In the chapter below, the coding process is exemplified, with a description of 
the multiple sources and considerations that have been involved in the data 
collection.  
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5 Analysis  
5.1 Raw data & codification 
In the figure below, the values from the qualitative codification and the raw data 
before being processed in Compass are presented. To strengthen the 
intersubjectivity of this analysis, the codification process of one variable (the 
dependent variable; political conflict) for one case (Israel) is presented in more 
detail below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The dependent variable labelled political conflict has in the case of Israel been 
valuated to 0.6, i.e. in accordance with the categorisation Evidence of more than 
five peaceful strikes, rallies, or demonstrations. In establishing this value, a 
qualitative examination of Israel’s water policy was carried out. Most data derive 
from the much encompassing academic work of Water Policy in Israel Context, 
Issues and Options (2013) by Becker (ed.). In the book, the chapter written by 
Spiritos and Lipchin (2013) reviews the privatisation project of desalination plants 
based on a build–operate–own contract type. The authors point to the fact that the 
price increase of water in connection to the privatisation project has generated civil 
protests in Israel (Ibid., 117). Due to its peaceful nature, the large protests, 
encompassing a quarter of a million protesters, still only generated a relative low 
value of 0.6. This information is supported by news articles which points to the fact 
that “young people, retired couples and families marched” (Kershner, 2011; 
Spiritos – Lipchin, 2013: 116), and that no article mentions riots, violence, or 
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injuries (Associated Press 2011). A similar codification and considerations has been 
given to each of the 36 variables of the four cases. In Appendix 1, the material 
collected to these variables as well as the specific considerations of each nominated 
value are presented.  
5.2 Results – with fuzzy set qualitative comparative 
analysis  
In the figure below the results are presented, after each variable have been codified 
and processed through Compass.  
 
Causal pathways/recipes (graphically): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Solution coverage: 0.642857 
Solution consistency: 0.946429 
 
The figure illustrates the consistency and coverage of the presumed causal pathway 
(see chapter 4 for a more detailed conceptualisation of consistency and coverage). 
According to the above results, we can with certainty (limited to the variables 
included in this study) conclude a consistency of 94 percent and a coverage of 64 
percent of the presented causal pathways. When processed through Compass, these 
causal combinations appear to explain conflict in the cases presented. 
While all cases and their recipes presented in the figure (Yemen, Israel and Gaza 
Strip) meet the consistency threshold (80 percent consistency), Jordan (as a 
“negative case” with low level of conflict) did not, since it did not produce a recipe 
that met the consistency threshold, thereof not included in the figure. In the Gaza 
Strip, legal conflict together with international financial institution involvement 
indicates a causal pathway; i.e. these variables, in combination, explain political 
conflict. In Israel and Yemen, economic impact on households are included in a 
causal pathway generating conflict. However, in relation to Yemen, economic 
impact on households explains political conflict in combination with non-
competitive bidding. In contrast, economic impact on households in combination 
with contract type explain political conflict in Israel. 
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However, while the results provided by the fs/QCA present the analysis with 
causal combinations, they present simplified results and lack more comprehensive 
explanations to why these pathways differ between the cases. The second step of 
this analysis involves a more comprehensive analysis with a comparative 
contextual analysis, where contextual factors of human-water relations within the 
concept of the “post-state hydraulic paradigm” will be included and analysed in 
relation to the above results.  
5.3 Results – with comparative contextual analysis 
In this section, the results provided in the fs/QCA will be contextualised in relation 
to the concept of the “post-state hydraulic paradigm”, focusing on unequal access, 
ecological fix and water related fears. The figure below illustrates a case overview 
followed by the comparative contextual analysis, where a contextualisation of each 
case is presented.  
Case details and overview  
 
 
 
 
 
5.3.1 Yemen & Israel  
According to the results provided by the fs/QCA, Yemen and Israel, present a 
similar causal pathway, where economic impact on households is included as a 
causal variable. However, in the case of Yemen, this variable is presented in 
combination with non-competitive bidding, and in the case of Israel this variable is 
presented in combination with contract-type.  
In relation to economic impact on households, the privatisation projects in both 
Yemen and Israel have generated increased costs on water prices. Market 
mechanisms for competitive prices have failed in both cases, where local elites 
(Yemen) or private companies (Israel) have taken over the provision of the major 
part of the water allocation (Sahooly, 2003: 141; Spiritos – Lipchin, 2013: 117). 
However, while this might explain the importance of economic impact on 
households, a more comprehensive approach is needed to explain the differences in 
causal combinations between Israel and Yemen.  
5.3.1.1. Israel – desalination plant 
In 1959, Israel wrote in its constitution: “The water resources of the State are public 
property, subject to the control of the state and destined for the needs of the 
State Year Contract type  Area 
Palestine  1997 Management contract Gaza Strip  
Jordan 1999 Management contract Greater Amman 
Yemen  2002 Commercialisation  Yemen 
Israel 2005 Build–operate–own Israel, desalination 
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inhabitants and development of the country” (Section 1, Water Law 5719-1959, in 
Spiritos – Lipchin, 2013 :117). Even though such a state-centric approach has been 
branded into the Israeli constitution, in 2005, the private company Global 
Environmental Solutions Ltd (GES) began a privatisation project of water 
management in the region, called Ashkelon desalination plant. In 2013, 25 percent 
of Israel’s drinking water came from this privatisation project (RO Legislative 
Council Secretariat, 2015: 3; Kislev, 2011: 13). With a seven-year drought in Israel, 
the government decided to ask manufactures to increase their production in the 
Ashkelon desalination plant. Thus, the contract type reflected high levels of 
autonomy and responsibility for the privatisation project, and low levels of 
autonomy and responsibility for the state. As a result, the price on water increased 
with 6-7 percent. A long tradition of maintaining low water prices in Israel was 
broken, and this, in turn, came to severely affect the consumers (Spiritos – Lipchin, 
2013 :117). This explains the significant economic impact on households. While 
these variables evidently were of great importance in the Israeli case, they do not 
explain this causal combination and the linkage to political conflict. When 
involving the concepts of water security-related fears and unequal access in the 
analysis, it becomes clear that increased water prices (generating an unequal access 
between rich and poor) and lack of local control over water and a securitisation1 of 
water (as a result of higher levels of autonomy for the privatisation project in 
addition to increased water prices), have had influential impact on the outcome. In 
2011, about 250,000-270,000 public protesters were marching the streets in Israel 
to protest against the privatisation of water management (Feitelson, 2013: 26-27; 
Kershner, 2011; Associated Press, 2011).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
1 Securitisation refers to the process in which a subject is made into matters of security, similar to the process of 
politicisation but tend to generate more extreme measures and consequences. The term was first coined by the 
influential scholars Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde (1998: 25). Even though this concept is not included in the 
theoretical framework of this study, it relates to the idea of Bakker’s water security-related fears and is central to 
the understanding of this factor. This is why securitisation is included in this study’s analysis.  
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5.3.1.2. The Yemen case of decentralising the water sector  
“I see unlicensed drilling rigs as mobile artillery batteries, and the tankers that 
distribute the groundwater as missiles landing in every neighbourhood” (Ferguson, 
2015). This quote reflects the effect of Yemen’s decentralisation and communal 
arrangements in the twenty-first century. The decentralisation of water management 
in Yemen, which started in 2000, has led to the fact that 95 percent of the urban 
population’s water resources is now (since 2011) provisioned by autonomous 
private water companies (Mewes, 2011: 159-160; Sahooly, 2003: 151). Hence, a 
small political elite has provided a small group of commercialising actors access to 
ground water, which in turn have generated a complete lack of competitive bidding. 
This has generated a price increase on water, with decreasing access to groundwater 
for the rest of the public. We see how both non-competitive bidding and significant 
economic impact on households are important elements in the privatisation of water 
management. However, it is also important to note that, while these features are 
evidently important in the privatisation of water management in Yemen, they are 
connected to an unequal access where a small elite have greater access to water 
than the rest of the public. In addition, with diminished governmental supervision 
of the access to ground water, the small elite of commercialising actors are 
benefitting from an ecological fix; the private company “tries to minimize his 
personal loss at the expense of the common resource" (Yemen farmer in Moore 
2000: 45). These features have clearly been influential in generating a violent 
conflict over water, involving tribes destroying their neighbours water 
infrastructure (ECC, 2018a; World Bank 1994, iii, Moore 2011: 45).  
In short, the privatisation project in Yemen, characterising a decentralisation of 
the water sector, has evidently given rise to the political conflict in the region - in 
combination with an ecological fix and an unequal access. 
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5.3.2 Palestine – the Gaza Strip  
 
In 1997, a privatisation project was established between the Palestinian authority 
and a French private company called Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux. The privatisation 
project was part of and made possible via the Oslo Accords and supported by the 
World Bank. It involved a set of benchmarks and performance rating system, which 
were established as incentives to enhance investments and efficiency (Saghir - 
Sherwood – Macoun, 1999: 3). While this project was agreed upon by both partners, 
the benchmarks and performance rating system made the privatisation actors to 
prioritise some issues, which yielded higher performance payment, than other 
“softer” issues – such as training and public relations (Ibid: 4). This prioritisation 
generated more profits for the company but was based on unequal access, where 
the private company was “cherry picking” which areas and which issues to focus 
on, based on what would generate more profit and higher performance rating. 
Evidently generating unequal access. Around the turn of the millennium, the 
privatisation project was ended due to inside legal conflicts over these issues (Hall 
- Bayliss - Lobina, 2002: 25).  
In late 2000 and the outburst of the al-Aqsa Intifada, violent uprisings targeting 
the unsatisfactory implementation of the Oslo Accords spread out in the Palestinian 
territories, to enhance the autonomy of the Palestinian Authority. While the 
significant international financial institution involvement and legal conflict 
evidently played a role in the reduced Palestinian autonomy, their connection to the 
outburst of the political conflict is not that clear. By involving the features of 
unequal access and water security-related fears to this analysis, which is clearly 
connected to the privatisation project and especially to the reduced Palestinian 
control over its scarce water resources, this causal combination can be understood 
in more detail.  
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5.3.3 Jordan – Greater Amman  
Jordan (focusing on the Greater Amman region) was selected as a “negative” case 
to this study. Jordan demonstrates a low (or insignificant) level of political conflict, 
and as a result, when processed through a fs/QCA analysis, a causal pathway 
between political conflict and the privatisation project elements was not found. 
There could be several reasons why the privatisation project; the management 
contract via the private company Suez Environmental, did not generate a political 
conflict.  
One of the more distinctive characteristics of the contemporary water supply 
system in Greater Amman is its rationing system, where households have received 
water once a week since 1987. The population of Greater Amman has learned to 
adapt to the extreme water scarcity in the region this way; where water is stored 
once a week either in large water tanks or provisional plastic barrels (Potter – 
Darmame, 2009: 121). The privatisation project via Suez Environmental was 
introduced in 1999 and managed the prevention of “lost” water, upgrading the water 
networks as well as improvements in billing and debt collection (Potter - Darmame 
– Nortcliff, 2007: 5300). The privatisation Suez Environmental introduced a 
proposal of an “around the clock service”, which would introduce the privatisation 
project with more profit and enhance employment possibilities. However, this new 
proposal would also generate an ecological fix, where commercialising forces 
would have to provide more water in an area with widespread water scarcity, hence 
potentially drain the existing water supplies. In January 2007, the privatisation 
project of water management in Greater Amman was terminated and effectively 
“deprivatised”, placed in the hands of a local state-owned company called 
Meyahona (“Our Water” in English) (Potter – Darmame, 2009: 116).  
When examining the raw data, it becomes evident that Jordan, in contrast to the 
other cases, demonstrates a significant higher level of legal conflict (0.8). The 
ecological fix introduced by the private company is evidently connected to the legal 
conflict between local authorities and the private company. Water security-related 
fears might also be involved and explain this inside tension; where a potential drain 
of water supplies has generated a fear to be deprived of the most vital life source. 
Consequently, the Ministry of Water and Irrigation (MWI) are now reluctant to 
allocate risks to the private sector and has continued with the efficient rationing 
system of water, though, now controlled by local authorities (Potter – Darmame, 
2009: 116).  
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5.4 Comparing Israel, Yemen, Gaza & Jordan 
The fs/QCA and the qualitative comparative analysis illustrates that political 
conflict emerges in all cases except Jordan. With the cases included in this study 
unequal access has been prevalent in all cases showing conflict, (e.g. the Gaza Strip, 
Yemen, and Israel). However, in Jordan, where no substantial political conflict 
emerges, the rationing water network has provided equal access to almost all 
citizens. Hence, a trend can be concluded when applying a contextual perspective; 
evidently unequal access is a critical factor when studying the causal combination 
of which factors explain political conflict. This general observation is resonating 
with the prior-research stating importance of scarcity and uneven distribution of 
resources (e.g. Hauge – Ellingsen, 1998).  
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6 Conclusions 
With reference to the findings of this study, it can be concluded that the causal 
pathways differ between cases in the Middle-East; where different combinations of 
different project elements of privatisation of water management can explain 
political conflict. The different causal pathways put together involve: (significant) 
economic impact on households; legal conflict; contract type; non-competitive 
bidding together with unequal access, ecological fix and water related security 
fears. However, one factor is prominent in all cases analysed; unequal access, or in 
the case of Jordan where no political conflict has occurred; equal access. This 
suggests that unequal access, in combination with several other contextual factors 
and project elements of privatisation of water management, can explain political 
conflict. It is important to note that this study’s findings are based on the assumption 
that the quantitative and qualitative material is correctly coded and limited to the 
variables included (excluding other potential variables and causal pathways). 
The aim of this study has been to fill in the gap of earlier research on 
privatisation of water management. This has been done by developing a two-step 
analysis, incorporating critical perspectives to previous research, and applying this 
to the Middle-East, where such research in this area is still missing. While these 
findings were made possible through the complex methodological tools of a fuzzy 
set qualitative comparative analysis and a contextual comparative analysis, and a 
combination of Boudet et al. and Bakker’s research, there are several limitations to 
the adoption of these frameworks that became apparent throughout the analysing 
process. While Bakker’s framework contributes with the critical contextual 
perspective and contextual factors, she does not determine the nature of these so-
called factors and how they are to be applied to a qualitative analysis. In line with 
the findings in this study, unequal access is perceived a particularly important 
aspect when analysing privatisation, water, and conflict. However, this “aspect” or 
“factor” is not explained as an independent variable. According to this study’s 
findings, future scholars are invited to conceptualise unequal access as an 
independent variable; to further examine its importance as “causative”.  
Concerning the selected variables, as has already been concluded in the second 
chapter on previous research, there is not yet a consensus on what variables can 
explain or cause conflict. This study is limited to the variables conceptualised by 
Bakker and Boudet et al. included in their framework, thus, excluding other 
potential variables. According to the findings in this study, there are some 
independent variables that are more evidently excluded from the analysis and that 
might be viewed as important to understand the conflictual trajectory of the specific 
case studies, namely: (1) drought and (2) prior violent conflicts.  
(1) In the case of Israel, the seven-year drought have evidently played a part in 
the water security-related fears in relation to the privatisation of water management, 
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and has likely played a part in the other cases as well. Future scholars are invited to 
incorporate and examine this variable in relation to the framework produced in this 
study. The implementation of drought as an additional variable could increase the 
understanding of the causal combination of the other variables.  
(2) This study has tried to involve an understanding of the local regulations in 
regard to water, however, excluding a historical perspective of the specific cases. 
Prior levels of conflict might affect the social and cultural stigmatisation against 
violence. This aspect might be interpreted as critical when comparing Yemen with 
more intense fighting over water and the peaceful demonstrations in Israel. Hence, 
a data-set measuring the frequency or history of conflict could be critical to 
understand the level of violence. In addition, a heritage of earlier conflicts regarding 
water might also be critical to understand the rise of conflict.   
Within this field of research, there is a need for a combination of both 
quantitative and qualitative studies (with critical connotations). Despite the fact that 
some important variables and factors are excluded from this study, the data 
gathering on privatisation of water in the Middle-East and the codification of this 
material as well as the critical addition to the analysis will hopefully fill the research 
gap in this area. Such contributions could be critical to understand interstate conflict 
and cooperation over water. In accordance with this study’s findings, water can be 
concluded to play a vital role in the ongoing conflicts in the Middle-East and will 
most likely continue to do so in the future. With rising insecurities and notorious 
humanitarian crises, more focus is needed on the domestic level. Combining a 
critical contextual and an instrumental perspective could help to understand this, 
and in the long run perhaps prevent conflicts.  
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8 Appendix 1. 
This section is summarising the sources and considerations for the qualitative data 
used in the codification for the fs/QCA. 
  
 
 
 
 
Israel Nominated value given from established categories based on 
qualitative research and sources and context specific argumentation 
for the given value 
Political conflict 0.6 Not including the conflict with the Palestinians regarding water. 
(Feitelson 2013: 26-27; Kislev 2011: 51; Kershner 2011; Associated 
Press 2011).  
Legal conflict  0.4 (Feitelson 2013: 25, 30-31) 
Proactive consultation  0.0 (Feitelson 2013: 25) 
International financial 
institution involvement 
0.0 (Spiritos – Lipchin 2013: 114-115) 
Host country equity  1.0 (Spiritos – Lipchin 2013:115)  
Size  1.0 (Spiritos – Lipchin 2013: 115; Kislev 2011: 9)  
Contract type  1.0 BOO-contract Ashkelon Desalination Plant, began construction in 
2003 and was put into operation in 2005 (Spiritos – Lipchin 2013: 
117; Kislev 2011) 
Competitive bidding 0.8 (Spiritos – Lipchin 2013: 117)  
Economic impact on 
households 
1.0 Coincided with a seven-year drought (Spiritos – Lipchin 2013 
:117) 
Yemen Nominated value given from established categories based on 
qualitative research and sources and context specific argumentation 
for the given value 
Political conflict 1.0 (Moore 2011: 45; ECC 2018a).  
Legal conflict  0.2 (Mewes 2011: 151; ECC 2018b).  
Proactive consultation  0.6 (Sahooly 2003: 139).  
International financial 
institution involvement 
0.6 Primarily the World Bank lenders in Germany and the 
Netherlands (Moore 2011: 43; Sahooly 2003: 139).  
Host country equity  0.0 Small between the elite and government (Mewes 2011: 123; 
Sahooly 2003: 141; Ward 2009: 235-236).  
Size  0.0 Political reform, relative small investment through 
decentralisation of the autonomy (Mewes 2011: 55-56; UNCDF 
2008: 21). 
Contract type  0.67 Communal arrangements and decentralisation executive, and 
regulatory functions (Mewes 2011: 22, 54, 85-90, 125, 128; Moore 
2011: 44; Sahooly 2003: 139).  
Competitive bidding 0.8 Interest of private elites (Moore 2011: 45; Mewes 2011: 159-160; 
Sahooly 2003: 151).  
Economic impact on 
households 
0.8 (Beh – Alameer 2013: 1383-1384; Moore 2011: 41).  
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The Gaza Strip, 
Palestinian territory  
Nominated value given from established categories based on 
qualitative research and sources and context specific argumentation 
for the given value.  
Political conflict 0.8 The conflict included is explicitly relating to the water 
management changes (Saghir - Sherwood – Macoun 1999: 2).  
Legal conflict  0.6. The conflict included is explicitly relating to the water 
management changes (Saghir - Sherwood – Macoun 1999: 2; Hall - 
Bayliss - Lobina, 2002: 25). 
Proactive consultation  0.0 (Saghir - Sherwood – Macoun 1999: 1; Ghuraiza – Enshassi 
2004: 1095) 
International financial 
institution involvement 
1.0 (Saghir - Sherwood – Macoun 1999: 2; Clarno 2008: 171-172). 
Host country equity  0.4 (Enshassi -Al-Najjar - Kumaraswamy 2009: 126-127) 
Size  0.6. (Saghir - Sherwood – Macoun 1999: 3) 
Contract type  0.33. Management contract (Saghir - Sherwood – Macoun 1999: 1; 
Cowen - Cowen 1998: 28).  
Competitive bidding 0.0 (Saghir - Sherwood – Macoun 1999: 1).  
Economic impact on 
households 
0,4. (Al-Ghuraiza, Enshassi: 2004: 1999-2000).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jordan, greater 
Amman  
Nominated value given from established categories based on 
qualitative research and sources and context specific argumentation 
for the given value.  
Political conflict 0.2 (The World Bank 2008: 75). 
Legal conflict  0.8 (The World Bank 2008: 75; Potter – Darmame 2009: 116; Potter - 
Darmame – Nortcliff 2010: 5301).  
Proactive consultation  0.6 (Suleiman 2002: 44; Al-Jayyousi 2010: 199).  
International financial 
institution involvement 
1.0 (Suleiman 2002: 22; Suleiman - Well - Gustafson 2008: 54-55).  
Host country equity  0.0 Greater Amman select stakeholders by Suez Environmental 
(Suleiman 2002: 20, 22; Al-Jayyousi 2010: 199-200; Potter - 
Darmame – Nortcliff 2010: 5300-5301).  
Size  0.6 (The World Bank 2008: 75; Potter - Darmame – Nortcliff 2010: 
5300; the World Bank group 2001: 9) 
Contract type  0.33 Management contract (Suleiman 2002: 16; Al-Jayyousi 2010: 
199-200). 
Competitive bidding 0.8 Opportunistic bidding for foothold in the region (Suleiman 2002: 
44 Gerlach - Franceys 2009: 338-339). 
Economic impact on 
households 
0.6 (Potter – Darmame 2010: 123; Potter - Darmame – Nortcliff 
2010: 5300-5301).  
